



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

file 3.1.2
6 AUG 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Degradation of Operational Readiness/Mission
 Accomplishment Due to Personnel Security
 Investigative Shortfalls

Reference is made to my previous memorandum, subject as above, dated June 8, 1981, directing a number of personnel security policy changes designed to remedy problems growing out of increasing investigative backlogs and unacceptable completion times. As pointed out then, those policies remain in effect until the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) reduces the backlog to 20,000 cases--at which time the DIS situation and personnel security policy will be reevaluated.

The effect of those measures, plus a significant DIS resource augmentation, is reflected in a steady reduction of the DIS backlog and the time it takes to complete investigations (current backlog: 57,864 cases, down from 84,250; current completion times: 147 days, down from 181).

We are not out of the woods yet. Our goal is to complete quality personnel security investigations in 65 days. Ultimate normalization of the situation requires the full cooperation of all DoD elements, especially continued emphasis on requesting only those personnel security investigations essential to mission accomplishment.


Further, a DoD select panel on personnel security recently completed a broad review of the Department's program. The panel findings are being carefully evaluated by this office to determine additional action required to enhance the program.

One matter, highlighted as a panel concern, involves individuals cleared for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information who continue for extended periods--after clearance--without apparent further observation or security evaluation. I share the panel's concern. A strong, on-going individual security assessment process is of fundamental importance:

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AVAILABLE*

Therefore, to give emphasis to this key aspect of the personnel security program, [REDACTED] Periodic Reinvestigations are modified by the procedures set forth in the attachment. These procedures are effective 15 August 1982.]


Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment

[REDACTED]
the moratorium levied on all Periodic Reinvestigations is modified by the procedures set forth in the attachment. These procedures are effective 15 August 1982.]

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PERIODIC REINVESTIGATIONPROCEDURES FORINDIVIDUALS CLEARED FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)

On the five year anniversary date of the completion of the most recent Special Background Investigation (SBI), the individual concerned will execute an updated statement of personal history (or personnel security questionnaire) to cover the period since the last SBI was completed.

Upon completion of the statement of personal history, the individual's immediate supervisor will review the statement of personal history to determine if any relevant personnel security information (in terms of criteria delineated in paragraph 2-200, DoD Regulation 5200.2-R) of which the supervisor is aware has been excluded; if the supervisor is knowledgeable of any such additional information pertaining to the individual, the supervisor will report it to the cognizant adjudicative authority. If the supervisor is unaware of such additional information, that fact will be affirmed in writing by the supervisor to the cognizant adjudicative authority.

When relevant security information is identified through the procedures detailed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the cognizant adjudicative authority will request such expanded investigation as is indicated.

Individuals cleared for access to SCI shall be advised that they may be requested to take a polygraph examination to be conducted on an periodic basis at any time after the initial clearance. The extent to which such examinations are administered shall be left to the discretion of the Components. The examinations will be limited to the following counterintelligence scope questions:

1. Have you ever been approached to engage in espionage or sabotage against the U.S.?
2. Have you ever engaged in espionage or sabotage against the U.S.?
3. Do you know anyone who is engaged in espionage or sabotage against the U.S.?
4. Have you ever been approached to give or sell any classified materials to unauthorized persons?
5. Have you ever given or sold any classified material to unauthorized persons?
6. Do you know anyone who has given or sold classified materials to unauthorized persons?
7. Do you have any unauthorized contact with representatives of a foreign government?

Failure to consent to a polygraph examination may result in denial
continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.

Paragraph III.B.6.d. is hereby amended insofar as refusal to consent
polygraph examination under the procedures set forth above.

All personnel cleared for access to SCI shall be notified of the
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